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INTRODUCTION 
Deference doctrines involve the extent to which courts, in their 
interpretation of statutes and regulations, should be influenced by how the 
agencies charged with administering these authorities construe them. 
Deference doctrine has received enormous attention in case law1 and 
commentary2 during the past three decades, both in tax and in 
administrative law. 
In Gonzales v. Oregon,3 the Supreme Court identified three strands of 
deference doctrine: deference under Chevron,4 deference under 
Skidmore/Mead,5 and deference under Auer/Seminole Rock (hereinafter 
ASR).6 The first and second strands have been well rehearsed in tax law.7 
                                                                                                                           
 
1 In tax, examples include United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 
(2012); Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011); Swallows 
Holding v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96 (2006) (en banc), rev’d, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008). 
2 In tax, examples include Kristen E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code 
Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239 (2009); Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax 
Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269 (2013); Steve R. Johnson, Mayo and the Future 
of Tax Regulations, 130 TAX NOTES 1547 (Mar. 28, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/ 
130tn1547.pdf; Steve R. Johnson, Intermountain and the Importance of Administrative Law in Tax Law, 
128 TAX NOTES 837 (Aug. 23, 2010), http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/128tn0837.pdf; Leandra 
Lederman, The Fight over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U.L. REV. 
643 (2012). 
3 546 U.S. 243, 255–56 (2006). 
4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
5 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944). 
6 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 
(1945). 
7 As to Chevron in tax, see, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax 
Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51 (1996); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 
REAL PROP. & TR. J. 731 (2002); Kristen E. Hickman, Of Levity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. TAX 
REV. 905 (2007); Steve R. Johnson, Swallows as It Might Have Been: Regulations Revising Case Law, 
112 TAX NOTES 773 (Aug. 28, 2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=926553. As to Skidmore/Mead in tax, see 
John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue 
Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39 (2003); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting 
Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006); Ellen P. Aprill, Linda Galler 
& Irving Salem, ABA Section of Taxation, Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX 
LAW. 717, 769–72 (2004). 
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Until fairly recently, however, the third strand was relatively 
neglected. As a leading commentator noted: 
The Chevron and [ASR] principles, which are functionally similar, could not 
have garnered more disparate reactions from the legal community. . . . Chevron 
deference has preoccupied administrative law scholarship in a way few issues 
ever have. Exhaustive academic commentary has scrutinized Chevron’s 
legitimacy and explored the seemingly innumerable questions that arise from its 
application. [ASR] deference, however, has long been one of the least worried-
about principles of administrative law.8 
Although Chevron is the most frequently cited case in American 
jurisprudence,9 in the first half century of its existence, the ASR principle 
largely went “unquestioned.”10 More recently, however, some light has 
begun to be focused on this previously dim corner. In a triad of recent 
cases, the Supreme Court explored issues raised by ASR deference.11 In 
addition, a body of ASR scholarship has developed.12 ASR has become a 
“hot” topic in contemporary legal discourse. 
However more work remains to be done on ASR deference. In 
particular, the doctrine has been insufficiently studied in tax. This article 
attempts to fill that gap by examining application of the ASR principle in 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of 
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 613–14 (1996). To similar effect, see Stack, infra note 12, at 
357–58; Stephenson & Pogoriler, infra note 12, at 1451–52. 
9 See STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 289 (5th ed. 2002). However, for an argument that Chevron, in 
fact though not in name, is collapsing into general “arbitrary and capricious” review, see Johnson, supra 
note 2, at 280–85. 
10 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10, at 
282 (3d ed. 1994). 
11 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. 
Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871 (2011). 
12 The longer works include Manning, supra note 8; Richard J. Pierce, Jr. & Joshua Weiss, An 
Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515 
(2011); Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355 (2012); Matthew C. 
Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449 (2011). See also 
Steve R. Johnson, New Light on Auer/Seminole Rock Deference, 61 STATE TAX NOTES 441 (Aug. 15, 
2011); Steve R. Johnson, Deference to Tax Agencies’ Interpretation of Their Regulations, 60 STATE 
TAX NOTES 665 (May 30, 2011); The Supreme Court 2011 Term: Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
357–66 (2012). 
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the Tax Court and comparing it to the application of the principle in other 
courts. 
This article has three parts. Part I describes ASR deference generally 
and sketches its vitality in federal and state courts. Part II addresses ASR 
deference in the Tax Court. It concludes that the Tax Court has been far less 
receptive to ASR deference than has the Supreme Court. Moreover, it 
demonstrates ways in which the Tax Court has blunted or deflected 
attempts to assert ASR, and it offers possible explanations for this behavior. 
Despite its frequent use, there are objections to ASR deference. Part III 
explores those objections and finds them to be powerful. Part III concludes 
that ASR deference is a dubious principle of law; and thus the Tax Court’s 
reluctance about the rule reflects greater wisdom than the Supreme Court’s 
enthusiasm for it. 
I. ASR DEFERENCE GENERALLY 
A. Origin and Prevalence of ASR Deference 
Statutes are, of course, the principal source of federal tax law.13 Yet 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code often contain gaps which Congress 
has authorized the Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) to fill by way 
of regulations.14 If properly promulgated and consistent with the statute, 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 Even in tax, there is a significant amount of common law rulemaking. See, e.g., Dobson v. 
Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 497–98 (1943); RANDOLPH PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 2 
n.2 (1938); Charlotte Crane, Pollock, Macomber, and the Role of the Federal Courts in the Development 
of the Income Tax in the United States, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2010). However, such 
judicial lawmaking in tax is interstitial. E.g., Comm’r v. Beck’s Estate, 129 F.2d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 
1942); Jerome Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretations, 47 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1259, 1271 (1947) (“supplemental law making [by the courts] should always, of course, be modest 
in scope”). At the core, it remains the case that “there is no natural law of . . . tax liability. . . . The 
amount of . . . tax a taxpayer owes . . . is determinable solely by reference to the positive provisions of 
the . . . tax laws . . . and the regulations . . . promulgated within the scope of [their] authority.” Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Miss. Tax Comm’n, 510 So. 2d 498, 500 (Miss. 1987); see also Masonite Corp. v. Fly, 
194 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1952). 
14 In addition to hundreds, perhaps thousands of specific authority delegations within particular 
Code sections, § 7805(a) give Treasury authority to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the 
enforcement of [the Code].” Different observers have tallied the number of specific authorities 
differently. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Tax Section, Report on Legislative Grants of Regulatory 
Authority, 2006 TNT 215–22 (Nov. 3, 2006) (finding approximately 550 specific authority delegations 
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Treasury tax regulations typically have the force of law.15 Yet even the 
regulations may be ambiguous in ways that are important to the resolution 
of ambiguous statutes. 
Chevron and Skidmore/Mead address how much deference courts 
should give to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. ASR speaks to 
how much deference courts should accord agency interpretations of 
ambiguous regulations. Over 60 years ago, in Seminole Rock, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court must 
necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the 
meaning of the words is in doubt. The intention of Congress . . . in some 
situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing between various 
constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, 
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.16 
Despite its appearance in Seminole Rock, this strand of deference is 
more often identified by reference to Auer, a 1997 case in which the 
Supreme Court taught that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation 
is “controlling” unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with” the 
regulation.17 Even before Auer, however, the Court stated that it was “well 
established that an agency’s construction of its own regulations is entitled 
to substantial deference.”18 
                                                                                                                           
 
in the Code). In 1940, the Code contained 56 delegations of rulemaking authority. Ellsworth C. Alvord, 
Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 252, 258 (1940). 
15 E.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 447–48 (2003); Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 115 (1939); Lantz v. Comm’r, 607 F.3d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2010). For 
description of how tax regulations are drafted, reviewed, and issued, see IRS Proc. Reg. § 601.601(a)–
(c); Mitchell Rogovin & Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and 
Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View from Within, 87 TAXES 21 (2009). 
16 325 U.S. at 413–14. Seminole Rock has been identified as the first case of this line. Talk Am., 
131 S. Ct. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
17 519 U.S. at 461. 
18 Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991). 
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The Supreme Court has invoked the principle in numerous cases.19 The 
lower federal courts have as well.20 The appearance and strength of the 
principle varies among the states, but it has been recognized at one level of 
puissance or another in numerous state cases, both tax21 and non-tax.22 
Adherence to ASR deference appears to be strongest in the U.S. 
Supreme Court. A considerable amount of empirical work has been 
conducted, studying the effects of the various standards of deference. To 
the extent they are comparable,23 the studies suggest that different standards 
of review often lead to similar outcomes. A 2011 article analyzed ten 
studies.24 It found that, with one exception, federal courts at all levels 
uphold agency actions about 70% of the time—regardless of whether the 
standard applied is Chevron, Skidmore, arbitrary-and-capricious, substantial 
evidence, or de novo.25 
The one exception is that the Supreme Court behaves extremely 
deferentially when reviewing agency interpretations of their own rules: 
upholding the agency about 91% of the time when it applies ASR.26 A 
subsequent study, however, found that the federal district and circuit courts 
                                                                                                                           
 
19 E.g., Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 171 (2007); Robertson v. Methow 
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989); Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988); 
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1965). 
20 E.g., Martin v. American Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 140, 144 (6th Cir. 1993). 
21 E.g., United Parcel Serv. Co. v. State Dep’t of Revenue, 1 P.3d 83, 84 (Alas. 2000); Texas 
Citrus Exch. v. Sharp, 995 S.W.2d 164, 169–70 (Tex. App. 1997). 
22 E.g., Beach v. Great W. Bank, 692 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 1997); Buffalo Twp. v. Jones, 778 
A.2d 1269, 1276 n.8 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001), aff’d, 813 A.2d 659 (Pa. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 821 
(2003). 
23 Comparability sometimes is limited because studies may consider different courts over 
different spans of time. 
24 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 77 (2011). 
25 Id. 
26 Id.; see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1142 
& tbl.15 (2008). 
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were less deferential: they upheld the agency about 76% of the time when 
applying ASR.27 
Statistics, however, do not always tell the whole story. By the 
numbers, ASR deference seems firmly established in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Yet, there have been rumblings of discontent from time to 
time. In a 1994 case, Justices Thomas, Stevens, O’Connor, and Ginsburg 
criticized some of the underpinnings of the doctrine, although they did not 
repudiate it outright.28 In a 1995 case, Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, 
and Thomas voiced concern about some consequences of applying the 
rule.29 In a 2011 case, Justice Scalia expressed substantial doubt as to the 
wisdom of ASR and announced his willingness to reexamine whether it 
deserves continued support.30 
Yet the course of legal doctrine often depends on accidents of personal 
and institutional biography. Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter are no 
longer on the Court. Justice Thomas authored a recent opinion for the Court 
reaffirming ASR, with Justice Ginsburg joining in that opinion.31 Justice 
Scalia has not yet been presented with the vehicle through which he can act 
on his epiphany. Until a new tide of history rolls in, ASR deference remains 
established in the Supreme Court. 
B. Exceptions to ASR Deference 
Despite the above statistics, even the Supreme Court can avoid or 
reject ASR deference when it thinks that wisdom walks a different path. 
Consider the Court’s 2005 Ballard decision. To make short a very long 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 12, at 519. 
28 Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 517 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by 
Stevens, O’Connor, and Ginsburg, JJ.). 
29 Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 84, 91–102 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting, joined 
by Scalia, Souter and Thomas, JJ.). 
30 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that he has become 
“increasingly doubtful” of the validity of ASR deference, adding “We have not been asked to reconsider 
Auer in the present case. When we are, I will be receptive to doing so.”). 
31 Id. 
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story,32 the issue was whether the Tax Court, in rendering its ultimate 
decision, had accorded sufficient deference to the findings of its special trial 
judge who had heard the case. The Supreme Court held that it had not and 
that the Tax Court had misapplied its own rules.33 
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Thomas, argued 
by analogy to ASR, noting that an agency’s interpretation of its own rule 
receives “controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation” and maintaining that the Tax Court’s interpretation of 
its Rule at issue was reasonable.34 The dissenters recognized, of course, that 
the Tax Court is a court, not an agency.35 However, in point of principle, 
they saw “no reason why Seminole Rock deference does not extend to the 
Tax Court’s interpretation of its own procedural rules.”36 
The Ballard majority brushed this aside. It grudgingly acknowledged 
that “the Tax Court is not without leeway in interpreting its own rules,”37 a 
formulation that plainly is less emphatic than Auer or Seminole Rock. 
Without extensive analysis of those cases or any other cases of the line—
indeed without even citation to any of them—and without questioning the 
court-to-agency analogy, the majority dismissed the Tax Court’s view of 
the applicable Rule as being unreasonable.38 
Ballard reflects the fact that ASR deference, although strong, is not 
unlimited. The current status of the rule is marked by three recent cases: 
Chase Bank,39 Talk America,40 and SmithKline Beecham.41 In these cases, 
                                                                                                                           
 
32 The full story is told in Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013). 
33 Ballard v. Comm’r, 544 U.S. 40, 59–64 (2005). 
34 Id. at 70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414). 
35 The first ancestors of the court were administrative units, but it has been an Article I court for 
generations. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 887–88 (1991); HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED 
STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 204–15 (1979). 
36 544 U.S. at 70 n.4. 
37 Id. at 59. 
38 Id. Nor did the majority attach significance to the fact that the Tax Court’s construction of its 
Rule had been “consistent with its practice during the more than 20 years since Rule 183 was adopted in 
its current form.” Id. at 70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
39 Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 871, 880–84 (2011). 
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the Court generally reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the deference 
principle. It also, however, identified limits to the principle. 
What are those limits? When the agency loses—9% of the time in the 
Supreme Court and 24% of the time in the federal district and circuit 
courts—why does it lose? Six main possibilities emerge from the case law. 
First, Auer itself states that deference does not attach if the agency’s 
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”42 
Accordingly, the SmithKline Beecham Court withheld ASR deference when 
it found the agency’s “interpretation of its regulations quite 
unpersuasive.”43 This limitation is a necessary incident of the Accardi 
principle. Under Accardi, an agency must comply with its own 
regulations.44 “[A] court cannot determine whether an agency has failed to 
comply with its own regulation without interpreting the regulation itself.”45 
When the court’s interpretation finds the agency’s interpretation to be 
clearly at variance with the regulation being construed, deference must be 
withheld. Any other rule would effectively permit the agency “under the 
guise of interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new regulation.”46 
Second, no deference is due if the regulation being interpreted is 
unambiguous. This was an aspect of the doctrine from the beginning—
Seminole Rock47—and it continues to be invoked in contemporaneous 
cases.48 This is a common-sense condition: there is no need for 
                                                                                                                           
 
40 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2260–63. 
41 Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2156–69 (2012). 
42 519 U.S. at 461. 
43 132 S. Ct. at 2169. 
44 United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954). 
45 Stack, supra note 12, at 359. 
46 Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000) (refusing to grant ASR deference). 
47 325 U.S. at 414 (stating that deference is appropriate “if the meaning of the words used [in the 
regulation] is in doubt”). This condition is not expressly stated in Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, but the 
discussion in that case makes it apparent that the Court’s concern was with interpretation of regulations 
containing “ambiguities.” Id. at 462–63. 
48 See, e.g., Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 740–41 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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interpretation—and thus no need for deference to interpretation—if the 
regulation itself is clear.49 
Third, Auer counsels that deference is unwarranted when there is 
reason to believe that the agency’s interpretation “does not reflect the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment on the matter in question.”50 
Suspicion on this score may arise from various circumstances: for instance, 
when the current interpretation appears to be merely a “convenient 
litigating position,”51 when the agency’s current position appears to be a 
“post hoc rationalization advanced by an agency seeking to defend past 
agency action against attack,”52 or when the current interpretation conflicts 
with the agency’s prior interpretation of the same regulation.53 
However, the current significance of the last point—agency 
inconsistency—is less than clear. In contexts other than ASR, the 
importance of agency inconsistency has been discounted.54 The 2011 Talk 
America case accorded ASR deference despite the novelty of an agency’s 
reinterpretation of a longstanding regulation.55 Yet the 2012 SmithKline 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 Cf. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“Where the language is plain and 
admits of no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise. . . .”); United States v. 
Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 95–96 (1820) (per Marshall, C.J.) (“Where there is no ambiguity in the words, 
there is no room for construction.”). “This principle is as applicable to a revenue statute as it is to any 
other type of legislation.” Prudential Ins. Co. v. United States, 319 F.2d 161, 166 (Ct. Cl. 1963); see, 
e.g., Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206, 219-20 (2001); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991) 
(stating that, when a statute is unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete “except in rare and 
exceptional circumstances”); Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 61 (1930). 
50 519 U.S. at 462. 
51 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988). 
52 Auer, 519 U.S. at 462 (quoting Georgetown Hosp., 488 U.S. at 212); see also Mississippi 
Gaming Comm’n v. Six Elec. Video Gambling Devices, 792 So. 2d 321, 328–29 (Miss. App. 2001). 
53 See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 515. 
54 See, e.g., Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 712 (granting Chevron deference to a general authority 
tax regulation and stating that agency inconsistency does not bar such deference); FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009). 
55 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2263 (“although the [agency] concedes that it is advancing a novel 
interpretation of its longstanding . . . regulations, novelty alone is not a reason to refuse deference”). 
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Beecham decision cited older law suggesting that inconsistency can thwart 
ASR deference.56 
Fourth, deference will be denied if the agency’s position is not settled 
or is not an authoritative expression of the agency’s position.57 The 
modality by which the agency’s position is set forth has been a 
controversial aspect of this exception. A position set out in published 
guidance, especially if it has gone through levels of review within the 
agency, stands a good chance of receiving deference. Courts have 
sometimes questioned whether deference is due to interpretations set out in 
informal announcement or in briefs.58 However, the agency’s position was 
set out in a brief in Auer59 and, in recent cases, ASR deference has been 
given to agency positions expressed in litigating briefs or amicus briefs 
filed in the case.60 
Fifth, ASR deference is in part a function of the agency’s special 
position: as drafter of the regulation, it presumably knows best what it 
meant to convey via the regulation.61 Circumstances undercutting this 
rationale argue against deference. For instance, the Supreme Court rejected 
ASR deference when all the regulation did was to parrot or restate the 
language of the statute.62 A number of tax regulations are “parroting 
regulations.”63 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 132 S. Ct. at 2166 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 514). 
57 See, e.g., Gose v. U.S. Postal Serv., 451 F.3d 831, 837–38 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Orion Flight Serv., 
Inc. v. Basler Flight Serv., 714 N.W.2d 130, 145 (Wis. 2006); Solis v. Postal Police Officers’ Ass’n, 
2012 WL 4056074, at * 3-4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 17, 2012). 
58 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 215, 222 n.8 (2d Cir. 2006) (in which 
an amicus brief is discussed on the merits of denying defence); Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 903–04 
(7th Cir. 2003); Houston Police Officers’ Union v. City of Houston, 330 F.3d 298, 304–05 (5th Cir. 
2003) (in which the ambiguities within an accepted Chevron deference are discussed). 
59 519 U.S. at 461. 
60 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2260–61; Chase Bank, 131 S. Ct. at 880. 
61 See, e.g., Abbott Labs v. United States, 573 U.S. 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009). For further 
discussion of this rationale, see infra Part IIIA. 
62 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 256–57. 
63 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6902-1 (1967); Treas. Reg. § 301.7207-1 (as amended 1985). 
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Sixth, the case for deference is particularly strong when the agency’s 
interpretation was long known to, and relied upon by, the regulated 
community.64 In its 2012 SmithKline Beecham decision, the Court borrowed 
from other administrative law contexts a principle that regulated parties are 
entitled to “fair warning” of the conduct that is required or prohibited by a 
regulation.65 The Court concluded that this principle had been violated and 
denied ASR deference to the agency’s interpretation of the statute. In 
reaching this result, the Court emphasized two facts: (1) holding for the 
agency would “impose potentially massive liability on [the regulated 
company] for conduct that occurred well before that interpretation was 
announced”66 and (2) the “agency’s announcement of its interpretation 
[was] preceded by a very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction [so that] 
the potential for unfair surprise is acute.”67 Because these facts may not be 
present to comparable extent in other cases, the significance of this 
exception remains to be established by future cases. 
II. ASR DEFERENCE IN THE TAX COURT 
Subpart A below details the Tax Court’s treatment of the ASR principle 
and finds that the court has been far less deferential under it than other 
federal courts have been. Subpart B advances possible explanations for this 
phenomenon. 
A. Extent of Tax Court Deference 
In the Tax Court, ASR claims do not succeed at anything like the 91% 
success rate they achieved in the Supreme Court—or even the 76% success 
                                                                                                                           
 
64 Tallman, 380 U.S. at 16–18. 
65 132 S. Ct. at 2167–69 (quoting, among other cases, Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991); Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 
1986)). 
66 132 S. Ct. at 2167. 
67 Id. at 2168. Also as to the importance of fair notice to the regulated party, see FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328–30 
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing to impose a fine because the company lacked fair notice of the regulatory 
interpretation upon which the agency relied). 
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rate achieved in federal district and circuit courts. Below, this article 
surveys recent cases in which the Tax Court has entertained ASR claims. 
It is difficult to say with absolute confidence precisely how many 
times the Tax Court has dealt with the ASR principle. In some cases, the 
court addressed what is in essence the rule without citing either Auer or 
Seminole Rock.68 Two things can be said, however. First, the Tax Court has 
discussed the principle over at least a third of a century in a significant 
number of cases—enough that reliable conclusions can likely be drawn. 
Second, the frequency with which the court has addressed the ASR principle 
has been increasing, with many of the decisions coming in 2009 and later 
years.69 
1. Early Cases 
Southern Pacific was an early treatment of ASR by the Tax Court.70 
The relevant issue involved amortization of the cost of emergency facilities 
under § 168. To qualify for favorable treatment, the taxpayer was required 
to show that the federal Office of Defense Mobilization (“ODM”) had duly 
issued a certificate confirming the necessity of the facility to the national 
defense.71 In dispute was whether the taxpayer had obtained the certificate 
within the time limit imposed by ODM’s regulations.72 The IRS maintained 
that ODM’s intent as to a timing limit was manifested in various ways, 
including the language of the certificate, statements made to Congress by 
ODM, correspondence, and testimony.73 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 See, e.g., Honeywell Inc. v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 624, 635 (1986); Woods Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 85 
T.C. 274, 281–82 (1985) (both holding against the IRS); Estate of Focardi v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 936, 2006 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2006-056 (2006) (invoking the principle as an alternative rationale). 
69 There are at least five 2009-or-later Tax Court ASR decisions: Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 
137 T.C. 100, 112 (2011); Carpenter Family Inv., LLC v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 373, 379 n.4 (2011); 
Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 219 (2010), rev’d on other grounds, 
650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012); Pierre v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 24, 40–41 
(2009) (Cohen, J., concurring); Lantz v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 131, 145 nn.10 & 151 (2009) (majority 
opinion & Halpern, J., dissenting), rev’d on other grounds, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010). 
70 S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497 (1980). 
71 Id. at 534–36. 
72 Id. at 537. 
73 Id. at 538–39. 
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The Tax Court held, however, that “[n]one of the items . . . show that 
the ODM ever manifested an intent” as to a time limit as argued by the 
IRS.74 In so doing, the court rejected the IRS’s reliance on ASR.75 Citing 
Udall v. Tallman, the Tax Court reasoned that: 
[N]either the ODM nor any delegate agency ever published any rules 
specifically indicating what it expected in the way of promptness . . . . Nor were 
any communications ever addressed to any applicant advising as to what conduct 
would be considered reasonable under the prescribed rules. 
We believe it is a necessary corollary [of ASR deference] that, in order for an 
agency’s interpretation to be binding in a given situation, it must be clearly made 
a matter of public record such that all affected parties are aware of it.76 
However, the Tax Court here was erecting a barrier far higher than one 
ever erected by the Supreme Court, in Tallman or subsequently. Tallman 
used the longstanding nature of the interpretation there at issue to deflect 
objections that the position unreasonably violated “detrimental reliance” 
interests.77 
Southern Pacific’s statement that the agency’s interpretation “must be 
clearly made a matter of public record such that all affected parties are 
aware of it” makes such notoriety a precondition for ASR deference—and a 
strong one.78 Notoriety was a shield to protect the agency in Tallman but 
was converted by Southern Pacific into a sword to strike at the agency. 
Contrast Southern Pacific to SmithKline Beecham, discussed above.79 
The Supreme Court case rejected ASR deference because there had been “a 
very lengthy period of conspicuous inaction” by the agency, reversal of 
which would have caused “potentially massive liability” for the taxpayer 
                                                                                                                           
 
74 Id. at 541. 
75 The IRS was urging deference to interpretation of another agency’s regulations, not its own 
regulations, but there is precedent for this sort of thing. E.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 109–
14 (1992) (deferring to EPA interpretation of state pollution statute incorporated by reference into EPA 
regulations); Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–97 (1991) (deferring to Labor 
Department’s interpretation of HEW regulations). 
76 S. Pac. Transp. Co., 75 T.C. at 541–42 (citing Tallman, 380 U.S. at 16–18). 
77 Tallman, 380 U.S. at 17. 
78 S. Pac. Transp. Co., 75 T.C. at 541–42. 
79 For discussion of SmithKline Beecham, see supra text accompanying notes 40–66. 
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for conduct occurring “well before” the reversal.80 That situation-specific, 
extreme-circumstances exception to deference was instead rendered by the 
Tax Court as a blanket precondition to deference that the agency’s position 
had previously been “clearly made a matter of public record such that all 
affected parties are aware of it.” The receptivity of the Supreme Court to 
ASR deference contrasts sharply with the hostility of the Tax Court to such 
deference. 
Fourteen years later, in CSI, the Tax Court again rejected ASR 
deference on the same ground. Citing Southern Pacific, the court stated 
that: “unless an agency’s interpretation of a statute or a regulation is a 
matter of public record and is an interpretation upon which the public is 
entitled to rely when planning their affairs, it will not be accorded any 
special deference.”81 The court stressed that the interpretation of the 
regulation urged by the IRS had not been set out in any ruling, procedure, 
or practice published before the litigation.82 
Again, though, the Tax Court’s formulation of the rule is more 
draconian than the Supreme Court’s formulation, as to agency 
interpretations of both statutes and regulations. As to interpretations of 
statutes, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have sometimes 
accorded Chevron deference to agency positions not formally set out before 
the controversy at hand.83 As to interpretations of regulations, this article 
has already noted that the Supreme Court granted ASR deference to agency 
positions set out in litigation or amicus briefs in Chase Bank, Talk America, 
and Auer itself.84 
In several cases between Southern Pacific and CSI, the Tax Court 
rejected ASR deference on a different ground. This article has illustrated 
that deference will not be accorded if the interpretation is plainly contrary 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2167–68. 
81 CSI Hydrostatic Testers, Inc. v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 398, 409 (1994), aff’d per curiam, 62 F.3d 
136 (5th Cir. 1995). 
82 103 T.C. at 409. 
83 See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57 
(1995). 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 58–59. 
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to the regulation.85 The 1993 case Phillips Petroleum involved the sourcing 
of sales income under Code § 863 and the “independent factory price” 
concept of longstanding regulations under § 863. The court acknowledged 
the ASR principle, but it rejected the IRS’s interpretation of the regulations 
set out in a much later notice. The court found that the notice entailed “a 
plain misreading” of the regulation which “effectively reads its plain 
meaning out of [it].”86 
The Phillips Petroleum court cited its 1986 Honeywell decision for the 
proposition that the IRS may not “‘override the express language of [its] 
regulations’ by administrative action.”87 The court read Honeywell as a case 
in which the IRS had tried “by revenue ruling to restrict the meaning of a 
term in a regulation that had a clear meaning.”88 
In its turn, Honeywell cited the Tax Court’s 1985 Woods Investment 
decision. Woods Investment involved the interplay between Code § 312 as 
to computation of earnings and profits and consolidated return regulations 
under § 1502.89 The Tax Court noted that the IRS’s current position was 
contrary to the view taken in several technical advice memoranda and in 
early stages of the audit in the case at hand.90 The court rejected the 
Commissioner’s attempt to “change [ ] his position to the one he advances 
herein[,] [although] he failed to amend his regulations to reflect his new 
position.”91 
The Woods Investment court reasoned: “Since [the Commissioner] has 
not taken steps to amend his regulations, we believe his apparent reluctance 
to use his broad power in this area does not justify judicial interference in 
                                                                                                                           
 
85 See supra text accompanying notes 41–44. 
86 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 78, 102 (1993), aff’d without opinion, 70 F.3d 
1282 (10th Cir. 1995). 
87 101 T.C. at 99 (quoting Honeywell, Inc. v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 624, 635 (1986)). Honeywell 
involved amortization of financing expenses. 
88 101 T.C. at 99. 
89 Woods Investment Co. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 274 (1985). 
90 Id. 
91 Woods Inv. Co. v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 274, 281 (1985). Neither Honeywell nor Woods Investment 
cited Auer or Seminole Rock. 
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what is essentially a legislative and administrative matter.”92 As noted 
above, the significance for ASR purposes of agency inconsistency is 
somewhat unsettled.93 However, the suggestion that a changed position can 
be made effective only by amending the regulation in question is stricter 
than current doctrine requires. 
The situation was not entirely bleak for the ASR principle, however. In 
a memorandum opinion in a 2006 gift tax case, Judge Laro invoked the 
principle as an alternative rationale.94 The significance of this invocation is 
undercut, though, by the fact that the Tax Court views its memorandum 
opinions as having lesser precedential weight than its “regular” opinions.95 
2. 2009 and Later Cases 
ASR appeared in the Tax Court’s 2009 Lantz decision,96 but it was 
used by the majority as a weapon against the IRS, not for it. Lantz was one 
of a series of cases testing the validity of a regulation under § 6015(f). 
Section 6015 prescribes a two-year limitations period for spousal relief 
claims under its subsections (b) and (c), but it is silent as to a comparable 
period under subsection (f).97 Treasury acted to fill the gaps, promulgating a 
regulation establishing a two-year limitations period under subsection (f).98 
The Tax Court repeatedly invalidated the regulation and was sometimes 
                                                                                                                           
 
92 85 T.C. at 282. 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
94 Estate of Focardi v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 936, 941, 2006 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2006-056, at 
941 (“Our view is further supported by the well-established principle that the judiciary should accord 
substantial deference to the Commissioner’s interpretation of Treasury regulations.”). The court cited 
the following cases for this principle: Jewett v. Comm’r, 455 U.S. 305, 318 (1982); Ford Motor Co. v. 
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1980); Blessitt v. Ret. Plan for Employees of Dixie Engine, Co., 848 
F.2d 1164, 1167–68 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Anderson Bros. Ford v. Valencia, 452 U.S. 205, 219 
(1981). 
95 See, e.g., Trapp v. Comm’r, 39 T.C.M. 1085, 1087, 1980 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 80,049, at 262 (1980) 
(“memorandum opinions of this Court are not relied upon as precedent [although] we seek to treat 
taxpayers consistently”). 
96 Lantz v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 131 (2009) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 607 F.3d 479 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
97 I.R.C. § 6015. 
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(1). 
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reversed on appeal99—until, under considerable political and professional 
pressure, Treasury withdrew the regulation. 
Lantz was one of the cases of this line, but ASR was invoked in Lantz 
in an unusual way. In one of the dissents,100 Judge Halpern argued in part 
that the rigor of the two-year limitations period was mitigated by the 
possibility of the IRS exercising discretion under the § 9100 regulations101 
to grant an extension of time for the filing of a claim.102 
The majority countered that both the IRS and the taxpayer agreed that 
§ 9100 relief was unavailable. The majority accepted this mutual position, 
bolstering it by invoking ASR deference to the IRS’s view of the § 9100 
regulations.103 
Judge Halpern made two rejoinders, harkening to both the Southern 
Pacific and Phillips Petroleum lines of cases. First, he argued that although 
ASR deference may be available when the IRS’s position is set out in 
published guidance, “[h]ere, the [IRS’s] position is no more than a litigating 
position.”104 Second, that position “in my view, is without merit, or, in the 
language of [Seminole Rock] ‘plainly erroneous’ and ‘inconsistent with the 
regulation,’ which would cause its rejection in any event.”105 
Lantz is revealing. The majority enlisted ASR, but against the IRS; that 
is, in the cause of invalidating the regulation in controversy in the case. 
Moreover, the majority’s defense of ASR was hardly robust. The majority 
                                                                                                                           
 
99 See, e.g., Mannella v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 196 (2009), rev’d, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011); Hall 
v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 374 (2010). 
100 Twelve Tax Court judges participated in the majority opinion invalidating the regulation. 
Lantz, 132 T.C. at 131, 150. Judge Gale dissented without opinion. Judge Halpern wrote a dissenting 
opinion. Id. Judges Thornton and Holmes wrote a separate dissent, agreed with by Judges Halpern and 
Morrison. Id. at 152, 161. 
101 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.9100-1(c), -3(a) (1997). 
102 132 T.C. at 150–51 (Halpern, J., dissenting). 
103 132 T.C at 144 n.10 (citing Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 414; and Phillips Petroleum, 101 T.C. 
at 97). 
104 Id. at 151 (Halpern, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. 
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did not specifically respond to either of the two objections made by Judge 
Halpern. 
If the majority’s view of ASR was tepid, Judge Halpern’s was 
positively hostile. He continued to press the “no deference without 
published guidance” argument despite the fact that the Supreme Court, 
twelve years earlier in Auer, had accorded deference to a position in an 
agency brief.106 And he merely asserted without explanation, reasoning, or 
authority his view that the IRS’s interpretation of the § 9100 regulations 
was without merit. A standard as high as “plainly erroneous” clearly 
demands more before one can say it is satisfied. 
A few months after Lantz, ASR was considered in Pierre, another full-
court-reviewed decision. The IRS had determined gift tax liability as to 
transactions in which the taxpayer had transferred cash and securities to a 
single member LLC and later transferred her LLC interests to trusts.107 The 
majority concluded that the LLC was not to be disregarded under the 
“check the box” entity classification regulations under § 7701, which was 
central to upholding the taxpayer’s valuation of the interests.108 
The IRS failed to argue that its interpretation of the regulations was 
entitled to ASR deference,109 but Judge Cohen considered ASR in her 
concurrence, stating: “We have no reason to believe that [the IRS’s] 
litigating position here is an interpretation of those regulations that reflects 
‘the . . . fair and considered judgment [of the Secretary of the Treasury] on 
the matter in question.’”110 
Judge Halpern dissented.111 He invoked the ASR principle, citing it 
using the majority opinion in Lantz.112 The Cohen concurrence, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 
106 Id. 
107 Pierre v. Comm’r, 133 T.C. 24 (2009). Ten judges participated in the majority opinion. 
108 Pierre, 133 T.C. at 35–36. 
109 Id. at 40 (Cohen, J., concurring). 
110 Id. at 40–41 (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 462). Eight other judges agreed with the concurrence. 
111 Id. at 41. Judges Kroupa and Holmes agreed with the Halpern dissent. Id. at 51. Judge Kroupa 
also filed a separate dissenting opinion with which Judges Colvin, Halpern, Gale, Holmes, and Paris 
agreed. Id. at 52, 60. 
112 Id. at 44 (Halpern, J., concurring). 
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dashed any thought that Lantz represented relaxation of the Tax Court’s 
narrow view of ASR. She stated that Lantz did not “adopt the litigating 
position of the [IRS] as distinct from preexistent and consistent 
administrative interpretations.”113 
Judge Cohen’s Pierre concurrence continues the approach of earlier 
Tax Court opinions. In addition, her language stating “[w]e have no reason 
to believe that . . .” bears mention. For the Supreme Court, proof of “not the 
agency’s considered judgment” creates an exception to deference. Under 
Judge Cohen’s formulation proof of “is the agency’s considered judgment” 
appears to be a predicate to deference. 
Moreover, Judge Cohen’s substitution of “of the Secretary of the 
Treasury” for “of the agency” is interesting. Presumably she would not 
require the Secretary’s personal approval; approval via delegation should 
suffice. The authority of the Commissioner comes by delegation from the 
Secretary of the Treasury.114 The Department of Justice represents the 
Commissioner in other courts, but the IRS Chief Counsel’s Office 
represents the Commissioner in the Tax Court. That Office has always been 
part of the Treasury, and it has been part of the IRS since before Pierre was 
decided. Briefs filed by IRS Counsel in “regular” Tax Court cases like 
Pierre are reviewed by Chief Counsel’s National Office.115 One wonders 
how much more is required to qualify for deference under Judge Cohen’s 
formulation.116 
                                                                                                                           
 
113 Id. at 41 (Cohen, J., concurring). 
114 I.R.C. §§ 7801(a)(1), 7803(a)(2). 
115 As to these structural aspects, see DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE 
JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE ch. 1 (2d ed. 2008). 
116 In a prominent non-tax case, Justice Breyer would have rejected explanations given for a 
changed FCC policy—because the explanations had been proffered by the Solicitor General on behalf of 
the FCC, not by the FCC itself. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 563 (2009) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was outvoted in that case, however. Moreover, because IRS Counsel is 
part of the IRS itself, even Justice Breyer might stop short of the position taken by Judge Cohen in 
Pierre. 
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In 2010, the full Tax Court decided Intermountain Insurance, another 
case involving the possibility of ASR deference.117 This decision was part of 
a line of cases testing the validity of Treasury regulations extending the six-
year statute of limitations of § 6501(e) to tax understatements resulting 
from basis overstatements. Ultimately, a divided Supreme Court held the 
regulation to be invalid, thus resolving a sharp split among the lower 
federal courts.118 
In Intermountain Insurance, a majority of the Tax Court held against 
the IRS.119 As relevant here, one of the issues was whether the regulations 
applied to the case at hand under their effective/applicability date 
provisions. The majority thought the regulations did not apply but chose not 
to rest its decision on that rationale alone.120 The majority acknowledged 
the ASR principle but, based on a “plain meaning” analysis of the 
provisions, concluded that the IRS’s view that the regulation did apply was 
“erroneous and inconsistent with the regulations.”121 
The Intermountain Insurance majority invoked ASR by name but 
discredited it in substance. As we have seen, the Auer standard is whether 
the agency’s interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.” This high bar was not passed. The majority’s “plain meaning” 
argument was not plainly right, indeed probably was not right at all.122 The 
Halpern/Holmes concurrence convincingly dispatched the argument,123 and 
                                                                                                                           
 
117 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211 (2010), rev’d en banc, 650 
F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012). For discussion of the case, see Johnson, 
supra note 2. 
118 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1844 (2012). 
119 Seven judges participated in the majority opinion. Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 225. Judge 
Cohen concurred in an opinion agreed with by Judges Gale, Thornton, and Marvel. Id. at 226. Judges 
Halpern and Holmes filed an opinion concurring in the result only. Id. I previously expressed my 
opinion that the Halpern/Holmes approach offered the best resolution of the issues. Johnson, supra note 
2, at 841. I remain of that view. 
120 Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 218–20. 
121 Id. at 219–20. 
122 See Johnson, supra note 2, at 840. 
123 Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 227–30. 
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the argument typically has been rejected by other courts considering the 
issue.124 
In 2011, the Tax Court decided Carpenter, another case involving the 
validity of the new section 6501(e) regulations.125 Carpenter also involved 
final regulations which replaced the temporary regulations at issue in 
Intermountain Insurance. The preamble to the regulations restated 
Treasury’s position as to applicability. Judge Wherry’s opinion for the Tax 
Court concluded that the text of the regulations did not support the position 
in the preamble.126 
Judge Wherry acknowledged the ASR principle127 and acknowledged 
that a preamble to a regulation may be a pertinent interpretive source.128 
Nonetheless, he declined to accord ASR deference, reasoning that: 
[W]hether a tax year in question is “open” is the very essence of these 
proceedings. Deferring to [the IRS’s] interpretation of “open” tax years for 
purposes of the effective/applicability date provisions would inevitably resolve 
the question of legitimacy of the regulations’ substance. More generally, if we 
were to allow the Secretary to replicate in his regulations the core of the Code 
provision at issue and then defer to the Commissioner’s interpretation of this 
regulatory text, it would inappropriately imbue this text with the solidity of 
[ASR] instead of subjecting it to the two steps of Chevron.129 
It is not surprising that this theory failed to command support from a 
majority of the court. ASR and Chevron operate in different spheres. ASR 
deference is considered when the meaning of the regulation is at issue. 
                                                                                                                           
 
124 See, e.g., Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1381–84 (Fed. Cir. 2011), 
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2099 (2012). 
125 Carpenter Family Invs., LLC v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 373 (2011) (en banc). 
126 Id. at 378–80 & n.4. Three other judges agreed with this opinion. Judge Marvel, without 
opinion, concurred in the result only. Judges Halpern and Holmes filed a concurring opinion. Judge 
Thornton also wrote a concurring opinion, with which Judges Cohen, Halpern, Holmes, and Paris 
agreed. 
127 Id. at 379 n.4. 
128 Id. at 379–80 n.4 (quoting Wyo. Outdoor Council v. United States Forest Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 
53 (D.C. Cir. 1999)) (“Although the preamble does not ‘control’ the meaning of the regulation, it may 
serve as a source of evidence concerning contemporaneous agency intent.”). 
129 Id. It is not clear whether Judge Wherry, through this language, was trying to invoke the anti-
parroting exception. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62. 
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Once that meaning has been determined, Chevron is considered to 
determine whether the regulation comports with the underlying statute.130 
The Halpern/Holmes and Thornton concurrences suggested that the case 
should have been resolved on the basis of the Tax Court’s precedents 
holding the regulations invalid. They were right. Doing so would have 
avoided the dubious adventures in the Wherry opinion.131 
Later in 2011, the Tax Court decided NEA.132 The issue in the case was 
how to calculate a labor union’s unrelated business taxable income, and the 
outcome hinged on a regulation promulgated under § 512. Although 
eventually holding for the IRS, the court rejected ASR deference. The court, 
citing Auer and Lantz, recognized the deference principle; however, it was 
unable to apply it.133 It was unclear that the IRS had in fact stated a position 
on the critical interpretation, or, if it had, what precisely that position 
was.134 It appears that the court was correct in declining to afford ASR 
deference in NEA. 
3. Evaluation 
The Tax Court typically gives at least lip-service to ASR. Sometimes it 
even applies ASR deference faithfully, both in cases in which the IRS 
prevails and cases in which it justifiably should not. However, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that, in the Tax Court, the ASR principle often is 
honored more in name than in substance. 
ASR claims succeed in the Tax Court far less often than they do in the 
Supreme Court or even than they do in the federal district and circuit courts. 
This lesser effect is sometimes achieved in the Tax Court by use of bad 
doctrine. Examples of this include the court’s adherence to a distorted 
notoriety element in cases like Southern Pacific and CSI. Other times, it is 
achieved by ungenerous application of good doctrine. Examples of this 
                                                                                                                           
 
130 See, e.g., Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993). 
131 See Carpenter, 136 T.C. at 397–405 (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring) and at 405–06 
(Thornton, J., concurring). 
132 Nat’l Educ. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 100 (2011). 
133 Id. at 112–13. 
134 Id. at 112–13 (“We cannot defer to a position that is not expressly articulated.”). Moreover, 
one possible interpretation would have ignored the actual language of the regulation. Id. at 113. 
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include Tax Court judges’ harsh, “hard look”135 deployment of the 
“interpretation contrary to the regulation” exception in Lantz and 
Intermountain Insurance and of the “no settled agency position” exception 
in Pierre. The record is clear that the Tax Court applies ASR in a much less 
deferential spirit than do other federal courts. 
B. Possible Explanations 
This article has shown that the Tax Court accords less weight to the 
ASR principle than do other federal courts. What could explain this 
behavior? Below, four possibilities are considered: (1) advocacy gap, 
(2) experience gap, (3) concept of proper tax administration, and (4) tax-
specialist versus generalist judicial orientation. It is possible that, with 
particular judges in particular cases, all of these may operate to a degree. 
However, the fourth explanation appears to be the most plausible and 
generally significant. 
1. Advocacy Gap 
Like adjudication in the United States generally, Tax Court litigation 
reflects the advocacy model more than the inquisitorial model.136 Thus, to a 
meaningful extent, the Tax Court depends on the parties to identify and 
develop the issues that require judicial resolution. It may be that, as to the 
ASR principle, the Tax Court has not always been well served by the parties 
appearing before it. 
Except in odd circumstances,137 the government will be the party 
relying on ASR. The IRS Chief Counsel’s Office represents the 
Commissioner in the Tax Court. Sometimes IRS Counsel fails to raise ASR 
when it could.138 The Department of Justice represents the Commissioner in 
                                                                                                                           
 
135 For discussion of “hard look” review in administrative law generally, see ALFRED C. AMAN, 
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 33–35 (1992). 
136 For discussion of these models generally and in tax in particular, see Bryan T. Camp, Tax 
Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act 
of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2004). 
137 Such as Lantz, 132 T.C. 131. See supra text accompanying notes 89–95. 
138 See, e.g., Pierre, 133 T.C. at 40 (Cohen, J., concurring) (noting that the IRS had failed to 
assert ASR deference). 
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other courts. The two sets of government tax litigators sometimes approach 
similar cases differently.139 In our context, the Department of Justice tends 
to be more accustomed to dealing with administrative law issues, and so 
may raise ASR more readily.140 This bureaucratic difference, although real, 
would explain the frequent appearance of the issue in the various courts 
more than it would the nature of the treatment it receives when it appears. 
Thus, other causes should be sought. 
2. Experience Gap 
Deference is a branch of general administrative law. In the past, the tax 
community often tended towards insularity141 and only slowly and 
grudgingly acknowledged the relevance of administrative law in tax 
controversies.142 
In decades gone by, some Tax Court cases addressed some 
administrative law issues143—but not often and, frankly, sometimes not 
very well.144 Perhaps the Tax Court’s out-of-step treatment of ASR 
deference reflected in part its limited experience with administrative law 
generally. 
                                                                                                                           
 
139 For example, the Department of Justice often makes fraudulent conveyance arguments in tax 
cases (usually tax collection cases) within its jurisdiction. IRS Counsel also deals with fraudulent 
conveyance because it is the most frequent substantive basis of transferee liability cases. The 
Department of Justice often premises fraudulent conveyance on the federal fraudulent conveyance 
statute, subpart D of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990, Title XXXVI of the Crime 
Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789, 4933. IRS Counsel rarely does so, relying instead 
on state fraudulent conveyance law. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 115, at 414–15. 
140 The Tax Court’s opinion in the Intermet case did not address ASR. The circuit court’s opinion 
on appeal did. Intermet Corp. v. Comm’r, 111 T.C. 294 (1998), rev’d, 209 F.3d 901, 904 & 906–07 (6th 
Cir. 2000). IRS Counsel handled the case in the Tax Court; Justice did so on appeal. 
141 This tendency has sometimes been called “tax myopia.” See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, 
or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994). It 
also has been called “tax exceptionalism.” E.g., Hickman, supra note 7. 
142 See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Civil’izing Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning 
to Statutory Notices of Deficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183, 183 (1996). 
143 See, e.g., Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282, 284 (1972) (discussing applicability of the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
144 See, e.g., Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 245 n.15 (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring) (criticizing 
the Tax Court’s handling of administrative law issues in Wing v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 17, 26–38 (1983)). 
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To the extent this ever was so, however, it is self-correcting. In the last 
fifteen years, there has been an explosion of litigation of administrative law 
issues in the Tax Court. In part, this has been because of the Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (“RRA”).145 RRA 
enacted a number of provisions—such as the spousal relief rules146 and 
especially the collection due process rules147—that have raised unavoidable 
administrative law issues.148 RRA also had an indirect effect in this 
direction. It established federal funding for low-income taxpayer clinics.149 
The consequent expansion of such clinics and their staffing has brought to 
the fore new corps of advocates who often have pressed administrative law 
issues in the Tax Court.150 
In addition, two other areas—unconnected with the RRA—have 
brought administrative law issues into sharper relief in the Tax Court. These 
areas are deference doctrine generally151 and procedural challenges to the 
validity of Treasury regulations.152 Deference doctrine generally is part of 
the explosion of Chevron-era case law and commentary. Increased 
procedural challenges to tax rules and regulations is inevitable as tax 
lawyers—slowly perhaps but inexorably—adjust to the “intrusion” of 
administrative law into tax law. 
                                                                                                                           
 
145 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 
Stat. 685 (1998) (codified in various sections of the Code). 
146 I.R.C. § 6015. 
147 I.R.C. §§ 6320, 6330. 
148 See, e.g., Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(collection due process). See also Wilson v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1552, 2010 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 134 
(2010), aff’d, 705 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2013) (spousal relief). See generally Danshera Cords, 
Administrative Law and the Judicial Review of Tax Collection Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429 
(2008); Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court Exempt from Administrative Law Jurisprudence 
when Acting as a Reviewing Court?, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603 (2010). 
149 I.R.C. § 7526. 
150 I am indebted for this point to Professor Leandra Lederman in a comment she made at the 
symposium “100 Years of the Federal Income Tax” held at Florida State University College of Law on 
March 1 and 2, 2013. 
151 See, e.g., Carlos v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 275, 280 (2004); Estate of Clause v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 
115, 119 (2004); Square D Co. v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 299, 307 (2002), aff’d, 438 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
152 See, e.g., Intermountain, 134 T.C. at 222–23 (Halpern & Holmes, JJ., concurring). 
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Thus, whether it likes it or not, the Tax Court is being forced to 
confront administrative law issues more and more often. Whatever 
historical significance an experience gap may have had as an explanation 
for the Tax Court’s unenthusiastic embrace of ASR, it is unlikely to operate 
powerfully in the future. 
3. Concept of Tax Administration 
Tax issues may be, or may be perceived to be, different from other 
types of issues in ways that make deference seem to be less justified. For 
instance, deference sometimes is thought to be more appropriate when 
agencies are engaged in policymaking than when they are engaged in 
purely technical administration.153 
Political legitimacy and accountability is part of the rationale 
articulated for Chevron deference. The Supreme Court stated: 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive 
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the government to 
make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress 
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by 
the agency . . . . [F]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to 
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for 
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between 
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones. “Our constitution 
vests such responsibilities in the political branches.”154 
Similar considerations also form part of the foundation for ASR 
deference. In its ASR decisions, the Supreme Court “has displayed the same 
concern with political accountability that underlay . . . Chevron.”155 Thus, 
in a 1980 non-tax case, the Court granted ASR deference to agency 
interpretation of regulations that involved “interstitial lawmaking.”156 In a 
1991 case, the Court justified ASR deference in part on the fact that the 
                                                                                                                           
 
153 For examples of areas of discretion in tax administration, see Steve R. Johnson, An IRS Duty 
of Consistency: The Failure of Common Law Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 77 TENN. L. 
REV. 585–88 (2010). 
154 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). Similarly, 
“[t]he Tax Court exercises judicial power to the exclusion of any other function. It is neither advocate 
nor rulemaker. . . . It does not make political decisions.” Freytag, 501 U.S. at 891. 
155 Manning, supra note 8, at 629. 
156 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980). 
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agency’s interpretation of its regulation could “entail the exercise of 
judgment grounded in policy concerns.”157 
It is sometimes thought that the job of the Department of Treasury and 
the IRS is only to execute policy determined by Congress, not to formulate 
policy themselves.158 One who views the missions of these agencies 
through this lens may find the case for ASR deference to be weaker as to tax 
agencies than as to more overtly policymaking agencies. 
This view of tax agencies is reminiscent of a formerly robust notion of 
the role of “independent” federal agencies. This notion was reflected in the 
famous Humphrey’s Executor case.159 There the court described the Federal 
Tax Commission (emblematic of independent agencies) as “charged with 
the enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are 
neither political nor executive [and] its members are called upon to exercise 
the trained judgment of a body of experts.”160 
In the decades since that decision, however, confidence in that 
conception has ebbed: 
It is not as obvious today as it seemed in the 1930s that there can be such things 
as genuinely “independent” regulatory agencies, bodies of impartial experts . . . , 
or indeed, that the decisions of such agencies so clearly involve scientific 
judgment rather than political choice that it is even theoretically desirable to 
insulate them from the democratic process.161 
Viewing the Department of the Treasury and the IRS as being removed 
from making policy was probably wrong from the start. The courts from 
                                                                                                                           
 
157 Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991). 
158 See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 1964-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689 (“It is the duty of the Service to carry out [tax] 
policy by correctly applying the laws enacted by Congress; to determine the reasonable meaning of 
various Code provisions in light of the Congressional purpose in enacting them; and to perform this 
work in a fair and impartial manner, with neither a government nor a taxpayer point of view.”). 
159 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
160 Id. at 624. 
161 Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d sub nom. Bowsher v. 
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). But see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 540 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing Humphrey’s Executor as “a landmark decision”). 
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early on accorded the tax agencies a great deal of interpretive freedom, 
ample space for making, not just implementing, policy.162 
In any event, that view is surely wrong now. The Department of the 
Treasury switched entity classification for tax purposes from a mandatory 
regime163 to a substantially elective regime when it promulgated the check-
the-box rules.164 Similarly, the Department of the Treasury writes the law 
governing consolidated income tax returns under an extremely loose 
congressional delegation.165 These and numerous other examples make it 
clear that, today, the federal tax agencies do not just implement policy; they 
make policy. Some in the tax community may cling to a narrower 
conception of the proper role of the Department of the Treasury and the 
IRS, and give ASR less shrift as a result. If so, however, they invoke a 
“reality” that may never have existed and surely does not exist today. 
4. Tax Specialist Versus Generalist Orientation 
Having considered and discounted three possible explanations for 
weak ASR deference in the Tax Court, this article reaches a fourth and more 
plausible possible explanation. The Tax Court, as a tax-specialist tribunal, 
may be less readily disposed to deference claims than are the generalist 
federal courts. 
Generalist judges—even those among the most illustrious—sometimes 
feel out of their depth when dealing with tax issues, a mood easily 
                                                                                                                           
 
162 See, e.g., Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900) (“Those who insist that such a 
regulation is invalid must make its invalidity so manifest that the court has no choice except to hold that 
the Secretary has exceeded his authority and employed means that are not at all appropriate to the end 
specified in the act of Congress.”); Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory 
Construction, 49 YALE L.J. 660, 661–62 (1940) (describing the judicial standard governing review of 
tax regulations as a “very flexible requirement”). 
163 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Comm’r, 296 U.S. 344 (1935); United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 
(9th Cir. 1954). 
164 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1–301.7701-3 (2013). Despite criticisms, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Can 
Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185 (2004), these regulations have been 
upheld, e.g., McNamee v. Dept. of Treasury, 488 F.3d 100, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2007); Medical Practice 
Solutions, LLC v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 125, 125 (2009), aff’d sub nom. Britton v. Shulman, 106 AFTR2d 
2010-6048 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2974 (2011). 
165 See I.R.C. § 1502. 
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conducive to deference. For example, Justice Frankfurter remarked on the 
complexities and perplexities for judicial construction of tax legislation: 
For one not a specialist in this field to examine every tax question that comes 
before the Court independently would involve in most cases . . . an inquiry 
[entailing] weeks of study and reflection. Therefore, in construing a tax law it 
has been my rule to follow almost blindly accepted understanding of the 
meaning of tax legislation, when that is manifested by long-continued, uniform 
practice, unless a statute leaves no admissible opening for administrative 
construction.166 
Similarly, Judge Learned Hand stated (arguably with overmuch modesty): 
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax . . . merely dance 
before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, 
exception upon exception—couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to 
seize hold of—leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally 
important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, 
but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate 
expenditure of time. I know that these monsters are the result of fabulous 
industry and ingenuity . . . ; yet at times I cannot help recalling a saying of 
William James about certain passages of Hegel: that they were no doubt written 
with a passion of rationality; but that one cannot help wondering whether to the 
reader they have any significance save that the words are strung together with 
syntactical correctness.167 
In contrast, Congress created the Tax Court168 as a specialized court169 
in part to provide greater expertise in tax cases.170 And, of course, the Tax 
Court does that. Most of its judges were tax attorneys before their elevation 
to the bench, and many had positions of responsibility in federal tax 
                                                                                                                           
 
166 Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177–78 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
167 Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947). 
168 For the history of developments leading to the contemporary Tax Court, see David Laro, 
Commentary, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 22. 
169 There is a large and growing literature on specialized courts. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (2d ed. 1996); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377; Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the 
Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990); see also Steve R. Johnson, The 
Phoenix and the Perils of the Second Best: Why Heightened Appellate Deference to Tax Court 
Decisions Is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 235–36 nn.1 & 2 (1998) (citing additional sources). 
170 See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Comm’r, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“I still think 
the Tax Court is a more competent and steady influence toward a systematic body of tax law than our 
sporadic omnipotence in a field beset with invisible boomerangs.”). 
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agencies or congressional tax staffs.171 The Tax Court’s specialized 
docket—consisting of only tax cases—reinforces that knowledge and 
experience.172 
Tax Court judges often—indeed usually—have greater tax experience 
and knowledge than the IRS Counsel attorneys arguing the cases before 
them (although, of course, the positions taken by such counsel have, in all 
substantial cases, been coordinated with Counsel’s National Office). The 
seed of deference is unlikely to germinate in such soil. 
Indeed, most judges of the Tax Court fought a rear-guard action 
against Chevron deference in Tax (especially as to general-authority 
regulations) until they were dragged along by generalist appellate courts. 
For example, in the 2006 Swallows Holding case, a majority of the Tax 
Court invalidated a general-authority regulation under § 882.173 Instead of 
Chevron, the majority applied as the controlling standard the pre-Chevron 
National Muffler case.174 Three dissenting opinions were filed,175 and the 
                                                                                                                           
 
171 One commentator remarked that “the tax bar and the specialized tax bench form a closed 
community that has developed many characteristics of a Mandarin class, including a conviction of its 
own ability to interpret properly a document which ordinary mortals find impenetrable.” John F. 
Coverdale, Text as Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1504–05 
(1997). One need not subscribe to all the language of this observation to acknowledge that its kernel 
contains some truth. 
172 This is not to suggest, of course, that Tax Court judges find their cases unchallenging. Even 
they sometimes give vent to frustrations like those felt by generalist judges. E.g., Rhone-Poulenc 
Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 533, 540 (2000) (noting the “distressingly complex 
and confusing” nature of the partnership audit and litigation rules); Foxman v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 535, 
551 n.9 (1964) (referring to the “distressingly complex and confusing nature of the provisions of 
subchapter K [which] present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension of these provisions without 
the expenditure of a disproportionate amount of time and effort even by one who is sophisticated in tax 
matters with many years of experience”); Lewis v. Comm’r, 35 T.C. 71, 76 (1960) (observing that 
tracking through the redemption rules is a “most exasperating task”). See also Shamik Trivedi & 
Jeremiah Coder, TEFRA Raises Complex Jurisdictional Issues, Judge Says, 135 TAX NOTES 985 (2012) 
(reporting remarks of Judge Mark V. Holmes). 
173 Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 148 (2006), rev’d, 515 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
174 Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 476–77 (1979). However, the Swallows 
Holding majority stated they would have reached the same result had they applied Chevron instead. 
Swallows, 126 T.C. at 131. 
175 The two most relevant dissents were by Judge Stephen Swift and Judge Mark V. Holmes. 
Swallows, 126 T.C. at 148–57 and 162–82. 
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Third Circuit properly reversed the majority’s holding on appeal.176 The 
issue was not put to rest until 2011 when the Supreme Court held that 
Chevron displaced the seemingly more rigorous National Muffler standard 
even as to general-authority regulations.177 
Why this foot-dragging? The famous Chevron “two step” directs a 
court to determine, first, whether the statute is ambiguous, and second, if it 
is, whether the agency’s interpretation is “permissible.”178 A permissible 
interpretation need not be the only or even the best possible construction; it 
need only be a reasonable construction.179 Thus, inherent in Chevron is the 
notion that a statute may have more than one acceptable meaning. 
A less pluralistic concept of law and meaning appeared to animate 
some Tax Court decisions.180 Thus, opposition to Chevron—and, by 
association, opposition to other deference doctrines like ASR—may be 
anachronistic: “a relic of the pre-Chevron days, when there was thought to 
be only one ‘correct’ interpretation of a . . . text.”181 Tax Court judges 
inclined to seek a single “true” meaning of a tax statute or regulation—and 
who see themselves equal to the IRS in this mission of discovery—may 
find deference uncomfortable. 
III. WHOSE VIEW IS BETTER? 
This article has shown that the Tax Court is less inclined to accord 
ASR deference than are other federal courts, certainly much less than the 
Supreme Court. With whom walks wisdom? Below, this article considers 
                                                                                                                           
 
176 For arguments against the holding and reasoning of the Swallows Holding majority, see Steve 
R. Johnson, Swallows Holding as It Is: The Distortion of National Muffler, 112 TAX NOTES 351 (2006); 
Johnson, supra note 7. 
177 Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 712. 
178 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
179 Id. at 865. 
180 See, e.g., J.C. Penney Co. v. Comm’r, 37 T.C. 1013, 1017 (1962) (“[i]n the interpretation of 
statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the 
intent of Congress”) (emphasis added) (citing Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank, 26 U.S. 64,65 (1828)). 
181 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 226 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
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both the justifications asserted for ASR deference and the objections offered 
against it. The conclusion is that the disadvantages are stronger than the 
advantages. ASR deference is a dubious rule of law. Accordingly, the Tax 
Court’s reluctance seems more soundly based than the Supreme Court’s 
enthusiasm. This part ends, however, on a cautionary note involving 
legitimacy. 
A. Justifications 
Numerous rationales for ASR deference have been offered by courts 
and commentators. They cluster into three areas: (1) the notion that the 
agency wrote the regulation, so it is best positioned to say what it means, 
(2) a set of ideas about the institutional roles of agencies and courts, and 
(3) complementary policy benefits. These are considered below. This article 
concludes that the asserted justifications have only limited force. 
1. “They Wrote It, So They Best Know What It Means” 
This has been the most important of the proffered justifications, 
because it seems to possess obvious common-sense appeal. One would 
think that the agency that wrote the regulations is in “a better position . . . to 
reconstruct the purpose of the regulations” than anyone else.182 Indeed, it is 
sometimes thought that ASR deference should be even broader than 
Chevron deference “because in the latter case the agency is addressing [the 
legislature’s] intentions, while in the former it is addressing its own.”183 
Others find this only “a weak justification”: 
[i]n many cases, the interpretation at issue was announced so long after the rule 
was issued that it is unlikely the agency decisionmakers who issued the 
interpretation played any role in the decisionmaking process that led to the 
issuance of the rule. Moreover, most courts . . . confer [ASR] deference . . . even 
when the agency changes it interpretation, as long as the agency acknowledges 
that it is making a change and gives plausible reasons for the change.184 
                                                                                                                           
 
182 Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152. See also 1 
KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.11, at 532 (3d ed. 
1994). 
183 Abbott Labs, 573 F.3d at 1330. See also Tallman, 380 U.S. at 801. 
184 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 12, at 516–17. 
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Moreover, those (like the author of this article) who incline towards 
textual approaches to interpretation cannot warmly embrace this rationale. 
The textualist asks not “what was the subjective intent of the author of this 
legal command” but “what objective intent does the document manifest in 
its language, structure, and context.”185 The “they wrote it, they know it 
best” justification is a purely subjective approach. 
Were subjective intent the touchstone for interpretation, presumably 
courts would receive testimony from legislators as to what the legislature 
meant when it drafted and enacted a statute. But Anglo-American law has 
rejected that approach since Blackstone at least,186 and courts 
overwhelmingly continue to reject it today.187 
2. Institutional Roles 
This cluster of arguments revolves around the idea that courts should 
respect the role of agencies and recognize the realities within which 
agencies operate. This includes both separation-of-powers and pragmatic 
strands. Although he did not endorse it, one commentator described the 
idea: “Viewed in isolation, [ASR] may be an understandable reaction to the 
exigencies of modern regulatory governance; it cuts agencies helpful 
interpretive slack in a world in which life is short, resources are limited, and 
agencies must address complex issues that have unpredictable twists and 
turns.”188 
The Court has defended ASR deference on the ground that it reflects 
“sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches” of our 
                                                                                                                           
 
185 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
16–17 (1997); Steve R. Johnson, The Two Kinds of Legislative Intent, 51 STATE TAX NOTES 1045 
(2009). 
186 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 58. 
187 See, e.g., Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 582 n.3 (1982); Adrian 
Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity 
Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1890 n.195 (1998). 
188 Manning, supra note 8, at 616–17. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). Manning rejects the quoted view, however, noting that 
ASR “cannot be considered in isolation.” Id. at 617. 
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government.189 An important part of that, of course, is the familiar 
argument that agencies, by virtue of their greater technical expertise, have a 
comparative advantage over the courts in determining the needs of 
regulation.190 
Courts should respect the role of agencies, no doubt. But courts have 
their own constitutional responsibilities as well; to act as the ultimate 
arbitrators of what the law means.191 At some point, cutting an agency slack 
to do its job becomes abdication by the court of its job. Accordingly, 
“balancing the necessary respect for an agency’s knowledge, expertise, and 
constitutional office with the courts’ role as interpreter of laws can be a 
delicate matter.”192 
Moreover, one may ask why these standard incantations justify the 
super-deference that the Supreme Court has extended under ASR. They are 
no more potent “in the context of agency interpretation of agency rules than 
in the context of agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes, 
agency policy decisions, or agency findings of fact.”193 These other contexts 
are governed by standards of review which yield pro-agency results far less 
frequently than ASR.194 
Super-deference is not justified by these rationales. This is particularly 
the case as to the Tax Court. Generalist judges know less about tax law and 
administration than do IRS officials. But the Tax Court is a specialized 
expert tribunal whose judges typically had extensive tax careers (often with 
the IRS) before appointment and have dockets composed exclusively of tax 
                                                                                                                           
 
189 Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991); see also Thomas Jefferson Univ. 
v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2387 (1994). 
190 E.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 151. 
191 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”); see also Bacher v. Office of State Eng’r, 146 P.3d 793, 
798 (Nev. 2006); Rump v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 710 A.2d 1093, 1098 (Pa. 1998). 
192 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255. 
193 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 12, at 517. 
194 See supra text accompanying notes 23–24. 
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cases.195 The comparative advantage institutional argument is no reason for 
ASR deference in the Tax Court. 
3. Policy Benefits 
Justice Scalia noted that among the “undoubted advantages to [ASR] 
deference” is that “[i]t makes the job of a reviewing court much easier.”196 
Perhaps this is true, but there are higher responsibilities for courts than 
looking to their ease. 
More significantly, an often voiced argument involves uniformity and 
predictability of the law. Specifically, 
[s]ince an agency’s jurisdiction is national and a circuit court’s jurisdiction is 
regional, a high degree of judicial deference to agency rules furthers the goal of 
maximizing national uniformity in implementing national statutes. Conversely, a 
low degree of deference would reduce national uniformity, since circuit courts 
are likely to adopt differing interpretations of agency rules.197 
Once again, however, this consideration is not unique. “[I]t is no 
stronger in the context of agency interpretations of agency rules than in the 
context of agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes,”198 so it 
does not justify a rule of super-deference. Moreover, this consideration 
applies with greater force with respect to geographically bounded federal 
district and circuit courts than with respect to the Tax Court, which has 
nationwide jurisdiction and was created to promote national uniformity in 
application of the tax laws.199 
                                                                                                                           
 
195 See supra text accompanying notes 153–57. 
196 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). The SmithKline Beecham Court quoted 
this statement in referring to ASR’s “important advantages.” SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2168 & 
n.17. 
197 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 12, at 517; see also Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2266; French v. D.C. 
Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 658 A.2d 1023, 1033 (D.C. 1995). 
198 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 12, at 517. 
199 See, e.g., DUBROFF, supra note 35, at 389 (citing congressional sources). 
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B. Objections 
1. General Objection—Perverse Incentives 
ASR is far from the only dimension of law in which courts are forced 
to grapple with the legal consequences of ambiguous drafting. Every first-
year law student is familiar with the contra proferentem canon under which 
ambiguities in a contract are interpreted against the party who drafted the 
contract.200 Some believe that this “venerable principle . . . does not apply 
to governmental directives,”201 but cognate principles do. For instance, 
statutes can be unconstitutional as “void for vagueness,”202 and ambiguous 
criminal statutes are often interpreted in favor of defendants under the rule 
of lenity.203 
ASR deference seems incongruous against the backdrop. Other sloppy 
drafters are punished. Why should ASR reward agencies for their sloppy 
drafting of regulations by giving them an opportunity—a preferred 
opportunity—to clarify? 
In an influential critique of ASR, Professor Manning has built on this 
foundation of incongruity by noting possibly pernicious incentive effects 
and constitutional ramifications. He argues that “one must assess [ASR’s] 
validity in light of the incentives that it supplies to an agency engaged in 
rulemaking.”204 And those incentives can be perverse. “If an agency’s rules 
mean whatever it says they mean (unless the reading is plainly erroneous), 
                                                                                                                           
 
200 See, e.g., Phoenix Control Sys., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 796 P.2d 463, 470 (Ariz. 1990) 
(Feldman, V.C.J., specially concurring). 
201 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 42 (2012). 
202 See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 
405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972). 
203 See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion); United States 
v. Cong. of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106, 142 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring) (“Blurred signposts to 
criminality will not suffice to create it.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 201, at 296–302. There has 
been a debate in recent decades as to whether the rule of lenity has been downgraded. At a minimum, 
reports of its death have been exaggerated. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 107–14 (5th ed. 2009). 
204 Manning, supra note 8, at 617. 
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the agency effectively has the power of self-interpretation.”205 What is 
wrong with that? Manning answers: 
This authority permits an agency to supply the meaning of regulatory gaps or 
ambiguities of its own making and relieves the agency of the cost of imprecision 
that it has produced. This state of affairs makes it that much less likely that an 
agency will give clear notice of its policies either to those who participate in the 
rulemaking process prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)206 or 
to the regulated public. The present arrangement also contradicts a major 
premise of our constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation of powers 
case law—that a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially 
dangerous to our liberties.207 
This critique has gained traction. A number of judges and courts have 
found it persuasive.208 Justice Scalia reworked the argument thusly, stating, 
“When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the 
implementation of an executive agency, it has lost no control over that 
implementation . . . . The legislative and executive functions are not 
combined.”209 In contrast, “when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, 
it leaves to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial 
determination of the rule’s meaning.”210 
Furthermore, 
though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the 
legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law. It seems 
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person 
who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.211 
                                                                                                                           
 
205 Id. 
206 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (prescribing notice-and-comment procedures). 
207 Manning, supra note 8, at 617. 
208 See, e.g., Anderson v. State Dep’t of Natural Resources, 693 N.W.2d 181, 186 (Minn. 2005). 
209 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
210 Id. (emphasis in original). 
211 Id. Justice Scalia quoted Montesquieu. “When the legislative and executive powers are united 
in the same person . . . there can be no liberty: because apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch 
or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.” CHARLES DE 
SECONDAT & BARON DE LA BREDE ET DE MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS bk. XI, ch. 6, at 151–52 
(O. Piest ed., T. Nugent Trans. 1949). 
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Moving from constitutional first principles to doctrinal particulars, 
Justice Scalia concluded: 
Deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a statute does not encourage Congress, 
out of a desire to expand its power, to enact vague statutes; the vagueness 
effectively cedes power to the Executive. By contrast, deferring to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which 
give it the power, in future adjucations, to do what it pleases. This frustrates the 
notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary 
government.212 
This concern is carefully reasoned and intriguing. However, it is not 
unquestionable. It makes a theoretical case, but “the proof of the pudding is 
in the eating.” If agencies have an incentive under ASR to behave 
strategically, are they in fact doing so? Proof of that fact is needed.213 
Arguably such proof was present in the Talk America context.214 
However, it is doubtful that the Department of Treasury and the IRS engage 
in such strategic behavior with appreciable frequency. The tax agencies 
repeatedly stress that they issue regulations and rulings to provide guidance 
to assist taxpayers in governing their affairs.215 This article accepts the 
sincerity of these assertions of purpose, and honoring that purpose is the 
counterincentive to the perverse incentive noted by Professor Manning and 
Justice Scalia. 
                                                                                                                           
 
212 Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
213 This is reminiscent of the clash between the majority opinion and Justice Blackman’s dissent 
in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). The majority invalidated the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
balanced budget act because the potential existed for a key administrator of the scheme created by the 
act to be removed in a fashion repugnant to the Constitution. Id. at 732. Instead of invalidating the 
whole scheme ab initio because the possibility existed, Justice Blackman urged a more modest remedy. 
“Any incompatibility [between the act and the Constitution] should be cured by refusing to allow 
congressional removal—if it ever is attempted—and not by striking down the central provision of the 
[act].” Id. at 777. Similarly, aware of the possibility of abuse described by Manning and Scalia, we 
could discard ASR deference entirely because of the possibility, or we could stay our hand until a 
convincing record has been established that the possibility turns into actuality with sufficient frequency 
and consequence. 
214 Justice Scalia appeared to think so. To the material quoted above, he added: “The seeming 
inappropriateness of Auer deference is especially evident in cases such as these, involving an agency 
that has repeatedly been rebuked in its attempts to expand the statute beyond its text, and has repeatedly 
sought new means to the same ends.” Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2266. 
215 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (2013); Mitchell Rogovin, The Four R’s: Regulations, 
Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756, 756, 763 & 776 (1965). 
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In addition, the Manning/Scalia concern is undercut by the 
antiparroting exception. As noted previously, ASR deference does not attach 
when the regulation merely repeats the language of the statute.216 This 
limits the agency’s ability to issue a wholly vacuous regulation in order to 
preserve maximum room for subsequent maneuver. To avoid the exception, 
the agency must go “beyond the language of the statute by particularizing 
or clarifying the statutory language to some significant but uncertain 
extent.”217 
This consideration does not wholly defuse the Manning/Scalia 
concern. Theoretically, an agency could still use notice-and-comment 
procedure to promulgate “a broadly worded rule that contains many 
ambiguities, as long as the rule clarifies or particularizes the statutory 
language to the extent necessary to avoid the ‘parroting’ characterization. 
The agency could then use the interpretive process to make most important 
decisions.”218 Although this theoretical window of strategic opportunity 
exists, it would be risky for an agency to try to crawl through it. It would be 
a delicate calculation to assess just where the antiparroting exception ends, 
and thus, where the range of maximum strategic opportunity begins. An 
agency that made too aggressive or optimistic an estimate would wind up 
losing ASR deference. 
2. Tax-Specific Objections 
In addition to general objections to ASR deference, several concerns 
are particular to the tax context. First, no taxpayer is liable for tax unless 
some law affirmatively makes her liable. Typically, such “law” is a statute. 
In some instances, by virtue of delegated authority, a Treasury regulation 
may be such law in the sense that it defines or provides a predicate 
condition triggering the liability established by statute. But it would be an 
uncomfortable stretch to allow such law to be an interpretation of an 
unclear regulation. Tax liability should not be “imposed upon the citizen 
                                                                                                                           
 
216 See supra text accompanying notes 61–62. 
217 Pierce & Weiss, supra note 12, at 518. 
218 Id. at 518–19. 
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upon vague or doubtful interpretations.”219 In particular, “the levying of 
taxes is the exclusive function of the Legislative branch and . . . the 
Executive may not exact taxes from the citizen except where the proposed 
exaction finds clear support in the taxing law.”220 
Second, “[t]ax laws, like all other laws, are made to be obeyed. They 
should therefore be intelligible to those who are expected to obey them.”221 
Vague regulations “clarified” by explanations by the Department of 
Treasury or the IRS make it difficult for citizens to understand and to fulfill 
their obligation to pay taxes they legally owe.222 
Third, ASR deference is in conflict with what may or may not be a 
canon of tax construction. A state supreme court stated that, “[i]t is a well-
established rule that a taxing statute must be strictly construed against the 
taxing power and in favor of the taxpayer, and all doubts as to whether or 
not a tax has been imposed must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.”223 
State tax cases often take this approach.224 The situation in federal tax 
cases is less clear. Hundreds of federal cases have invoked the pro-taxpayer 
canon.225 Yet many federal cases have rejected the canon or simply ignored 
                                                                                                                           
 
219 In re Del Busto’s Est., 6 Pa. C.C. 289, 297 (Pa. Orph. 1888) (quoting Powers v. Barney, 5 
Blatchf. 202 (1863)). 
220 Masonite Corp. v. Fly, 194 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1952). 
221 Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Lederer, 21 F.2d 320, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1927). 
222 Supreme Court justices have repeatedly stressed the importance of protecting reliance interests 
against excessive agency interference in both tax, e.g., United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 
132 S. Ct. 1836, 1849 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment), and non-tax 
contexts, see, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 541–42 (2009) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 536 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
223 State Tax Comm’n v. Edmondson, 196 So. 2d 873, 876 (Miss. 1967) (quoting State v. 
Johnson, 118 So. 2d 308, 313 (Miss. 1960)). 
224 See Steve R. Johnson, Pro-Taxpayer Interpretation of State-Local Tax Laws, 51 STATE TAX 
NOTES 441 (Feb. 9, 2009). 
225 See, e.g., Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93 (1934) (describing the 
canon as “a salutary one” but finding it inapplicable on the facts of the case); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 
151, 153 (1917). 
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it,226 and many others have applied instead what amount to pro-IRS canons 
of construction.227 
Broadly speaking, a pendulum has swung in our tax history. When 
limited-government values are in the ascendancy, courts trot out the pro-
taxpayer canon. When international or domestic crises make activist 
government appear necessary, the canon recedes in the reported cases.228 
After the 1940s, the principle largely disappeared from the federal 
decisions, except in occasional decisions from the Court of Claims, its 
successors, and the Sixth Circuit.229 About a decade ago, two opinions in a 
Supreme Court case asserted the continuing vitality of the pro-taxpayer 
canon,230 but it has not been prominent in subsequent case law.231 
If the pro-taxpayer canon exists and has vitality,232 it and ASR 
deference operate at cross purposes. In cases of ambiguity, one can favor 
the taxpayer or one can favor Treasury and the IRS. One cannot favor both 
the taxpayer and the tax agencies. 
                                                                                                                           
 
226 See, e.g., Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 286 (1933). 
227 Such as the canon that tax exemptions are construed narrowly. See, e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. 
United States, 534 U.S. 84, 95 (2001); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988). 
228 Steve R. Johnson, Should Ambiguous Revenue Laws Be Interpreted in Favor of Taxpayers?, 
NEV. LAWYER, Apr. 10, 2002, at 15 (chronicling the pendulum phenomenon). 
229 See, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 894, 897 (6th Cir. 1969). 
230 United Dominion Indus., Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 839 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) and id. at 839 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
231 Justice Scalia has lamented that the pro-taxpayer canon “unfortunately can no longer be said to 
enjoy universal approval.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 201, at 299–300. 
232 There is always the question of whether a canon actually influences the outcome of a case or 
serves only as “table thumping,” i.e., as a rhetorical device to justify or rationalize results reached 
through other means. However, it appears that the canon has been material to the outcome of at least 
some federal and state cases. See, e.g., Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917); Gross Income Tax 
Dep’t v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 48 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Ind. App. 1943); Appeal of William 
Grove, Inc. 56 Pa. D. & C. 2d 510, 515 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Cumberland Cnty., 1972); A.N.B. Corp. v. 
Comptroller of Treasury, 1990 WL 10957, at *6-7 (Md. Tax Ct. 1969). 
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C. Evaluation 
There are respectable arguments on both sides of the ASR controversy. 
For the purposes of this article, there are three relevant inquiries. The first 
inquiry involves one’s general approach to statutory interpretation. As 
noted above, ASR deference involves an intentionalist approach.233 This 
author shares Justice Holmes’ view. To paraphrase, “[w]e do not inquire 
what the [agency] meant; we ask only what the [regulation] means.”234 
The second inquiry involves context. If one believes that ASR 
deference is good (or bad) as a general matter, are there reasons to reverse 
that judgment in the particular context of tax? In this author’s view, the 
presumption should be against such reversal. Tax rules should reflect more 
general rules of law unless there is good reason for deviation.235 The 
Supreme Court has endorsed this approach.236 Possible relevant differences 
between tax and non-tax contexts are described and, for the most part, 
discounted above.237 
The third inquiry involves legitimacy. Assume that one believes that 
ASR deference is generally unwise or that it is generally acceptable but is 
unwise in the tax context. Would such a conviction justify the Tax Court’s 
ungenerous application of ASR? The Supreme Court has not announced a 
tax exception to ASR, and of course the Tax Court has not tried to do so 
                                                                                                                           
 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 159–64. 
234 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 203, 207 (1920) (quoted with approval in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 
U.S. 384, 397 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
235 See Johnson, supra note 2, at pt. IIIA2. See also Caron, supra note 141; Michael Livingston, 
Practical Reason, “Purposiuism,” and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677, 677–79 
(1996) (pondering whether different methods should be used in interpreting tax as opposed to other 
types of statutes but noting that “the lure of uniformity remains great” and expressing “skeptic[ism] 
regarding the supposed uniqueness of tax law”). 
236 The taxpayer “has not advanced any justification for applying a [different] standard of review 
to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the rules of any other agency. In the absence of 
such justification, we are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law 
only. To the contrary, we have expressly recognized the importance of maintaining a uniform approach 
to judicial review of administrative action.” Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
237 See supra parts II.B.3., II.B.4., and III.B.2. 
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overtly. The Tax Court’s campaign against ASR deference, if that 
description is fair, has been guerilla, not conventional, warfare. 
CONCLUSION 
Speaking of ASR, a recent circuit court case observed that “deferential 
review is not inconsequential.”238 One could be forgiven for thinking that, 
in Tax Court ASR cases, “deferential review is not deferential.” 
This article has shown that, in federal courts generally and in the 
Supreme Court especially, agencies prevail at a high rate when they assert 
ASR. That is not true in the Tax Court, where ASR claims lose more often 
than they succeed. That is not accidental. A variety of factors, including the 
nature of tax cases and differences between subject-matter specialist and 
generalist courts, interact to produce these disparate outcomes. 
What are we to make of this normatively? The Tax Court might be 
taken to task for judicial insubordination; for applying ASR—surely 
knowingly—in a more restrictive fashion than the teaching of the Supreme 
Court would countenance. The Tax Court could perhaps be defended 
against such an accusation based on contextual differences: the “tax versus 
non-tax” and “specialist versus generalist” explanations for the discrepancy. 
Alternatively, the Tax Court might be defended on the ground that it is 
right and the Supreme Court is wrong. ASR is an unwise principle of law. 
Its harms exceed its benefits, and the doctrine should be abrogated. The Tax 
Court’s hostility to ASR may sound in that realization. If, as occasional 
rumblings inspire hope for, the Supreme Court may ultimately downgrade 
or dispense with ASR deference, it may be that the Tax Court is less 
insubordinate than prescient. 
                                                                                                                           
 
238 Summit Petrol. Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir. 2012). 
